Moscow, July 8, 2022, Institute RUSSTRAT

Turkiye has opened a Pandora’s Box of issues by reneging on its declared intent to block the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO until those two countries extradited the Kurdish terrorists who had allegedly sought asylum there. This was the opinion of the Russtrat Institute, a conservative think tank closely aligned with the Kremlin, in its assesment of Turkiye’s decision to withdraw its objection in return for a trilateral security agreement. The agreement assured Ankara not only that extradition proceedings would begin, but also that procurement restrictions on types of weapons available to Ankara would be lifted.

Of course, the main issue that Turkiye’s flipflop has engendered is to force Russia to prepare a military response, should the western alliance’s ever-closer encroachment to Russian sovereign territory require it, according to the Russtrat analysis. A problem for Sweden, and by extention for the EU, is the large Kurdish presence in the country, which, in the face of the extradition of a number of members of that community, could ignite a destabilizing reaction. Needless to say, Russtrat’s fawning nationalist analysts lay this turn of events squarely at the feet of the “U.S.-UK Anglo-Saxon bloc.”

I would suggest that the end to this story has yet to be told. Moscow certainly was supporting Ankara’s latest ‘thumb-in-the-eye’ to NATO and is disappointed, and may even feel betrayed by Erdoğan. It remains to be seen whether he is seeking certain concessions from Putin, possibly regarding the situation in Syria, and sees this nod to NATO enlargement as a means to an end. On the other hand, Russtrat seems to intimate in the article the possibility that Russia could befriend Kurds to use them as an “instrument of pressure on Turkey [when] necessary.”

The article, as translated, appears below:

The completely unexpected 180-degree turnaround of Ankara related to Sweden and Finland naturally became one of the loudest news flashes of the recent NATO summit in Madrid. Contrary to the previous, loud statements about the unacceptability of receiving Sweden and Finland, Turkiye signed the trilateral memorandum.

NATO acts on the basis of consensus, and this means that the president of Turkiye, Recep Erdoğan could have blocked Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to the alliance, which he threatened to do, if his demands were not carried out. As is reported, the breakthrough happened after four hours of negotiations not long before the beginning of the summit and allowed the process to begin for including Finland and Sweden in the alliance.

Let’s remember, Ankara was demanding that Sweden and Finland cease supporting Kurdish armed groups, such as the PKK, and withdraw prohibitions on the sale of certain types of weapons to Turkiye. The PKK, recognized as a “terrorist” group in Turkiye, the European Union, and the United States, has been fighting against Turkiye with varied success since 1984, as it seeks autonomy.

NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, stated that the conditions of the deal propose that Sweden set to working on Turkiye’s requests concerning the extradition of suspected fighters and introduce amendments in Swedish and Finnish legislation to toughen up their approach to the Kurds. Stoltenberg also stated that Sweden and Finland will remove their limitations on the sale of weapons to Turkiye. Finland and Sweden promised to not introduce an embargo in the area of the defense industry in relation to Turkiye and initiate “concrete steps for turning over terrorist criminals.”

A highly-placed representative of the U.S. administration informed Reuters that Turkiye was not tying its earlier request for the F-16 U.S. fighter jet as a provision of the deal. Earlier, the U.S. had prohibited Turkiye to acquire F-35 fighter jets after Ankara acquired the S-400 missile defense system from Russia in 2017.

Erdoğan had stated just before leaving for Madrid that he would insist on a deal with U.S. President Joe Biden for the delivery of F-16 fighter jets. It is expected that Biden will meet with Erdoğan during the summit. In the opinion of western observers, months will still be required for Finland and Sweden to officially accede to NATO, since their accession to the alliance must be ratified by all individual member-states.

Erdoğan’s sharp change of position must have valid reasons. To the obvious ones it is possible to relate removing from the agenda the conflict with Washington because of acquiring the S-400; certain electoral bonuses – in exactly one year presidential elections in Turkiye; and, canceling the embargo on the delivery of weapons models.

As for the non-obvious, but possible are: a package of economic bonuses – inflation remains a serious problem for Turkiye, and the national currency has lost half of its value in just the last months. A request for financial support seems a completely logical step. At the same time, Erdoğan retains significant space for maneuvering. It will take months to ratify accepting the two countries, and given the need, Turkiye can rescind its agreement, if the behavior of Sweden and Finland – but also Washington – will not satisfy Ankara’s wish.

In the West, the main loser was immediately designated as Russia, which, that is to say, would be a too quick and unilateral evaluation. The trilateral agreement can activate a slew of responses in various regions.

Who will be the Kurds’ new friend?

Fourteen million Kurds live in Turkiye, which makes them one of the largest ethnic groups in the world that do not have a homeland. Their 30-million population is scattered throughout Turkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Syria as well as in diasporas worldwide. To the Kurds’ allies – this is a very changeable phenomenon, depending on the historical moment – it has been possible to attribute the U.S. and Syria, and as enemies have sometimes been numbered Iraq and Iran. The Kurds stay the main partisan threat to Turkiye, the war with which Erdoğan to a large degree has defined as a priority of his foreign policy.

At the moment, Turkiye is conducting a military operation in the north of Syria and Iraq, the assignment being to create a 30-kilometer security zone to the south of its borders. First “they will cleanse of terrorists” in the areas of Tel-Rifat and Manbij, and afterward possibly spreading to the areas of Ain-al-Arab and Ain-Isa. Noteworthy was Erdoğan announcing that the U.S. is delivering weapons to the Kurds – which adds a certain dimension to the ongoing operations.

In the chance that the EU actually fulfills Erdoğan’s “Kurdish” wish list, then the Kurds will be looking for new friends for themselves, which, depending on the current situation, can be Russia, the U.S., Syria, Iran, the UAE and many other potential beneficiaries, to whom an instrument of pressure on Turkiye is necessary. Considering the mass of weapons, which were delivered to Ukraine and afterward show up on the ‘dark net’ in free sale, there would be nothing surprising about modern weapons systems appearing with the Kurds.

It is not at all obligatory that a partnership be stable and continuous. Constant betrayals of the Kurds by partners has become a sad tradition, and this means that Kurdish detachments can wage a sufficiently chaotic foreign policy [i.e., per the preceding paragraph, by serving as ‘partisans for hire’ to ‘new friends’ who might find such strongarm tactics necessary when dealing with Erdoğan – translator note].

The Problems of Sweden and not only

The trilateral memorandum will influence the internal political situation in Sweden, where the Kurdish diaspora is sufficiently large and commands a certain influence. On the order of 100 thousand citizens of Kurdistan live on Swedish territory [translator note: apparently inferring that there is a Kurdish presence throughout the entirety of Sweden, which historically consisted of four ‘lands’: Götaland, Svealand, Norrland, and Österland]. In addition, six members of the Parliament in Stockholm are of Kurdish descent. The agreement with Turkiye brings Sweden out of the category of “quiet havens” for Kurds, which probably will summon a social and political reaction at those levels, which are accessible to Kurds and those sympathizing them.

The Kurds have already stated that they oppose the very principle of extradition of any political actor, from whatever country he might be. Noting that realizing the agreement with Turkiye will affect, above all, the reputation of Sweden and Finland themselves, human rights, freedom, democracy and all Swedish society.

The situation on the whole appears even more unsightly. In fact, the Anglo-Saxon bloc, i.e., the U.S. and Great Britain, in need of strengthening a knockout punch against Russia, “pushed through” the EU accepting into NATO Sweden and Finland, in the course of which an entire people became a bargaining chip. As also the internal policy of the EU and, separately, of the two northern countries.

Accepting Sweden and Finland into NATO finally buries the EU’s ability to be its own actor – if earlier it ransomed only its economy to Washington, now the European Union has voluntarily deprived itself of security to the north. Russia inevitably will react to a threat at its side, using all available technical means.

Although the situation with the acceptance of Sweden and Finland into NATO has gotten off the ground, some time will pass before the official entry of these countries into the alliance. It is hardly worth waiting for the emergence in the EU of a powerful societal reaction in support of the Kurds that will force reexamining the decision concerning the acceptance of Sweden and Finland. It is possible here to only consider Turkiye the weak link, which over and over has demonstrated the ability to swiftly change “categorical” positions.

However, now in the EU a powerful ethnic Kurdish opposition has emerged, for whom, by and large, there is nothing to lose. Such a social factor certainly does not add to the stability of the EU.

One can say that “surrendering” the Kurds in exchange for favoring Turkiye has violated the status quo in the Middle East, exacerbated the situation with the security of the EU to the north, forced Russia to develop measures of countering the strengthening of NATO, and created a negative social factor in Sweden and Finland. It also witnessed another drop in the authority of the EU in the international arena. At the same time, Erdoğan still has the possibility of rescinding the agreement at any moment – although he would hardly succeed in quickly putting the brakes on all the actions enumerated above.